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Before the decision in the Killits case December 4, 1916, it had
been the practice of many district judges to suspend the execution
of sentence indefinitely by a method known as "laying the case
on file," or "sentence deferred until further order of the Court."
This procedure was more than sixty years old and at the time of the
Killits decision there were in excess of 2,000 persons at large on
suspended sentences. In ex parte United States Petitioner Man-
damus Judge Killits, Mr. Chief Justice White writing the opinion,
it was held that a district judge was without power to suspend
sentence indefinitely. It was argued for Judge Killits that the
power existed at common law and many cases were cited as tending
to uphold it. It was pointed out that the best reason for holding
that the power existed was a long and continuous exercise by State
and Federal judges.
It was pointed out that there were two types of reprieves at
common 'law-"Ex Arbitio Judis," or "Ex Necessitate Legis." The
latter covered cases of temporary suspensions, as for insanity, preg-
nancy, etc. The former seemed to apply wherever it appeared that
injustice would result from conviction or execution. This power
was an implied common law exception to the statutory duty to
punish. If the Courts could suspend sentences to limited time in
avoidance of injustices, why not indefinitely?
It was further argued for the respondent that the practice of
suspending sentence in the Federal Court had been followed for a
long time with the tacit approval of administrative officers of the
Government and presumably recognized by the legislative branch
which had made no move to make provision by statute.
However, the Supreme Court held that the practice was incon-
sistent with the Constitution, ". . . since its exercise in the very
nature of things amounts to a refusal by the judicial power to
* Acting Supervisor, United States Probation System.
242 U. S. 27.
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perform a duty resting on it and, as a consequence thereof, to an
interference with both the legislative and executive authority as
fixed by the Constitution." The Court suggested"... probation
legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise,"
to answer the need of the judiciary to exercise ". . . enlarged but
wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to
them for judgment . .. ."
Notwithstanding the fact that Chief Justice White had pointed
out that the legislature could devise a remedy for the situation,
ten years passed before the enactment of the Probation Law. Such
leaders in the probation field as Charles L. Chute, Herbert Parsons
and Judge Hoffman appeared before the Committee of Congress
and pointed out the crying need for probation legislation. Their
efforts were in vain largely because' of the opposition of Mr. Vol-
stead and other friends of the National Prohibition Act. Those
opposing argued that if probation legislation was passed that many
judges unfriendly toward the purposes of the Volstead Law would
use the provisions of the Probation Law to nullify the effects of
the Volstead Act by placing all Prohibition Law violators on pro-
bation. Later developments showed that Mr. Volstead's fears were
well founded because in a few districts trial judges did abuse the
use of probation. This abuse was terminated, however, with the
repeal of the 18th Amendment.
Constitutionality of Probation Act
One of the earliest attacks brought against the Federal Proba-
tion Act was directed against the question of constitutionality. All
of the cases, however, hold the act to be constitutional.
The attacks, for the most part, were brought on the ground
that the power of a judge to place one on probation encroached
upon the executive power to pardon. The Court held this position
as untenable and pointed out that there is no conflict.'a The power
of the President to pardon one ". . . extends to every offense
known to law, and may be exercised at any time after its com-
mission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their
pendency, or after conviction and judgment." A State case-
Belden v. Hays,2 was cited with the notation that that case draws
a distinction between probation after sentence and pardon. The
former involves a change of judgment; the latter leaves sentence
3a Nix v. James, 7 Fed. 2nd 590.
2 88 Vt. 500.
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as it was passed, but protects the defendant from its operation. In
one case3 the Court cites the Supreme Court decision in the Killits
case holding that there was no authority for suspended sentence
(before Probation Act), but specifically stated that the legislative
power to provide for probation was adequately complete.
Purposes of Probation Act
Chief Justice Taft in writing the opinion in United States v.
Murray4 states the purpose of the Probation Act in the following
language:
"The great desideratum was the giving to young and new offenders
of law the chance to reform and to escape the contaminating influence
of association with hardened or veteran criminals in the beginning of
the imprisonment. Experience had shown that there was a real locus
poenitentiae between the conviction and the certainty of punishment, on
the one hand, and the actual imprisonment and public disgrace of
incarceration and evil association, on the other. If the case was a proper
one, great good could be done in stopping punishment by putting the
new criminal on probation. The avoidance of imprisonment at time of
sentence was therefore the period to which the advocates of a Proba-
tion Act always directed their urgency. Probation was not sought to
shorten the term. Probation is the attempted saving of a man who
has taken one wrong step and whom the judge thinks to be a brand
who can be plucked from the burning at the time of the imposition
of the sentence."
Chief Justice Hughes in Burns v. United States5 said:
"The Federal Probation Act * * * was designed to provide a period
of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of a penitent offender; to take
advantage of an opportunity for reformation which actual service of the
suspended sentence might make less probable."
Grounds for Probation
It has been pointed out that the granting of probation is a
matter of grace and not of right. No defendant can demand the
privilege. There is no requirement that it can be granted on a
specified showing." Old age, insolvency, chronic ailments, hardship
to family did not constitute an undeniable claim to probation.7
Neither did a pending petition for pardon or motion for new trial
3 Riggs v. United States, 14 Fed. 2d 5.
4275 U. S. 347.
5 287 U. S. 216.
6 Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216.
7 United States v. Meagher, et al., 36 Fed. 2d 824.
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or stay of execution or review on appeal entitle one to probation
during the time he is awaiting the outcome.8 Imprisonment for a
crime is not a brand of infamy, avoidance of which may be urged
as a ground for probation, nor is a recommendation of leniency by
convicting jury a ground for probationY
The placing of one codefendant on probation does not entitle
another codefendant to the same privilege. 10
Restrictions on Power of Trial Judges
The trial judge cannot place one on probation for a period
exceeding five years, the limitation specified in the statute." The
Court is not restricted to the length of time for which the person
might be sentenced to prison. The probation term can be longer
or shorter as the Court wishes. In the case of Hollandsworth v.
United States,' it was argued for the appellant that the Court
could not impose a probation sentence to run longer than the
maximum imprisonment penalty for the offense committed. The
Court said:
"There is indeed no necessary connection between the term of pro-
bation and the term of imprisonment."
It was pointed out that the purpose and desired end of probation
is the rehabilitation of the offender. The supervision period should
be long enough to test the probationer's good faith. It was not the
intent of Congress to limit the. period except by the expressed five
year provider in the statute.
Where the Court attempts to suspend sentence without placing
the defendant on probation, the suspension is invalid since the Pro-
bation Act.'" The suspension was ruled invalid but the sentence
held good.
The trial judge is not prevented from deferring sentence tem-
porarily pending reports of probation officers. 4 It is interesting to
note in this connection that the Supreme Court rules of practice
prescribed by order of May 7, 1934, under the authority of an Act
of Congress approved March 8, 1934, provides that:
s United States v. Davis, et al., 19 Fed. 2d 536.
9 United States v. Nix, 8 Fed. 2d 759.
10 United States v. Gargano, 25 Fed. 2d 723.
" Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216.
12 34 Fed. 2d 423.
13 Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U. S. 206.
14 EX Parte De Angelo, 50 Fed. 2d 547 and Rosenwinkel v. Hall, 61 Fed. 724.
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"After plea of guilty or verdict of guilt the Court shall impose
sentence without delay unless (1') * * * (2) the condition or character
of the defendant, or other pertinent matters, should be investigated in
the interest of justice before sentence is imposed."
It is reasonable to assume that Congress, in enacting the Probation
Law, and the Supreme Court, in prescribing rules of practice pro-
viding temporary delay of sentence, realized that district judges
need sufficient time in which to have a thorough investigation
made, by their probation officer, into the past history, habits, con-
duct, work record, family responsibilities, and such other matters
as the Court will wish to be advised concerning, before shaping the
punishment of the defendant. Without sufficient time for such
investigation the purposes of the Probation Act will be defeated by
its abuse in granting the privilege to undeserving persons and with-
holding it from those who are good risks. Without sufficient in-
formation regarding a defendant's past, the Court may extend the
privilege to an anti-social person. The recommendation of the pro-
bation officer is supported by information ascertained aftei careful
investigation and is not subject to the criticism leveled against
recommendations by prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel
which may be biased. It is imperative that the probation officer
be a well-trained skillful investigator who discharges his duties
free of all extensive influences. The service demands a very high
type personnel.
The District Court is not restricted merely to the suspension
of the execution of sentence, but may also suspend the imposition
of sentence.-'
The trial judge cannot provide for probation after the beginning
of the execution of sentence. Chief Justice Taft wrote the opinion
in United States v. Murray,G in which it was pointed out that Con-
gress did not intend this provision as executive clemency already
applies to these cases and the parole laws also apply to prisoners
serving more than a year and a day. To have granted judges this
power would have permitted them to encroach upon the executive
power to pardon. 17 The trial Court has jurisdiction after term and
after affirmance on appeal to hear petition for probation provided,
of course, execution of sentence has not been entered upon.', It
has been held also that a district judge is without power to impose
15 United States v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347.
16 275 U. S. 347.
17 Only one case contra: United States v. Chafina, 14 Fed. 2d 622.
18 Kriebel v. United States, 10 Fed. 2d 762.
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sentence of imprisonment and at the same time provide for the
release of the prisoner on probation after he has completed service
of a portion of the sentence. In the case of United States v.
Praxuiis'19 the Court said:
"The Court has not power to arrest execution of the sentence after
the sentence is closed, and the defendant having passed from the Court's
jurisdiction by delivery to the Marshal to carry sentence into execution,
by a restrictive provision to take effect in the future, which amounts
to a commutation of sentence of conditional parole, which is the province
of the executive department."
In the case of Archer v. Snook"0 the Court said:
"It (the Court) cannot, therefore, impose one imprisonment sen-
tence, and provide for its suspension and'for probation after it is partly
executed.
"I am convinced that such a procedure, at least in the case of a
penitentiary sentence, is unwarranted. The penitentiaries are at a great
distance from most of the judges. It would involve much complication
to place persons on probation after arrival at the penitentiary. By their
incarceration, the shame, stigma and criminal contact, which the pro-
bation system sought in proper cases to avoid, will have already been
accomplished. The existing provision for paroles is sufficient to meet
most cases deserving leniency."
The Courts are not in accord on the question whether a person
convicted on several counts may be committed to the penitentiary
on some count while at the same time be placed on probation on
other count or counts. The most recent case on the point 2' held
that the various sentences on the different counts were essentially
one sentence and that since the defendant had been confined to
prison on some count the attempted probation of the remaining
count was void. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals took the oppo-
site view in 1930, six years prior to the Greenhous decision. 2 The
Supreme Court has not.ruled directly on this question, but in the
case of Burns v. United States" the revocation of probation was
held good where a jail sentence and a probation sentence had been
imposed on different counts of the same indictment. It would
appear that the Greenhaus case presents the better view. It is not
believed that Congress intended to provide both probation and im-
prisonment for the same offender. (There is no question but that
'10 49 Fed. 2d 774.
20 10 Fed. 2d 567.
21 United States v. Greenhaus, 85 Fed. 2d 116.
22 White v. Steigleder, 37 Fed. 2d 858.
23 287 U. S. 216.
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the trial judge may sentence one to imprisonment on one indict-
ment and on a separate indictment place the person on probation.)
This practice, however, appears to be in contradiction to the pur-
poses of the probation statute. The intent of the law was to save
the young, inexperienced or casual offender from the stigma and
experiences of imprisonment. The question of the power of the
Court to place one on probation and also impose a fine on the same
indictment is also unsettled. However, the weight of authority
seems to hold that this arrangement is possible. The probation
statute provides: 2
"When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Court that the ends
of justice and best interests of the public, as well as the defendant, will
be subserved thereby, shall have power after conviction or after plea
on nolo contendere for any crime or offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and to place the defendant upon probation for a period and upon such
terms and conditions as they may deem best; or the Court may impose
a fine and may also place the defendant upon probation in the manner
aforesaid.125
In the case of Barney v. Aderhold26 the Court pointed out that
Congress intended for the "condition" to be consistent with the
rehabilitation of the offender. A fine may be a proper "condition,"
but imprisonment would not be.
It appears that the Probation Act confers upon the Court the
power to reduce a fine or change any of the conditions imposed
during the period of probation. In United States v. Wagner 7 the
Court said:
"It is therefore a reasonable interpretation of the statute and its
purpose to hold that when a sentence is imposed upon the defendant,
whether of a fine or imprisonment, and same is suspended and defendant
placed upon probation, that such sentence deemed proper at the time
becomes a condition of the probation order expressly stated or not and
like any other condition before entering upon any service of the sentence
may thereafter be changed, enforced, increased or reduced within the
particular law applicable as the Court in its legal discretion may later
find necessary to subserve the ends of justice and best interests of both
the public and the defendant."
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court will permit the
reduction of a sentence within the term when service of the sen-
24 United States Code, Annotated, Title 18, 724.
25 In accord Reeves v. United States, 35 Fed. 2d 323; contra: Archer v. Snook,
10 Fed. 2d 567; also Santis v. Esola, 50 Fed. 2d 516.
26 D. C. Ga., Jan. 19, 1935 (unreported).
27 Eastern District of New York, December 4, 1933 (unreported).
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tence has actually begun on the theory that the sentence remains
in the breast of the Court until the end of the term.2 8 Before this
decision, the majority view held otherwise. Although the Court
may reduce the sentence, it cannot change a prison sentence al-
though for less than a year and a day to probation. United States
v. Murray.20  Although the trial judge has "an exceptional degree
of flexibility in administration" of the Probation Act and "broad
discretion," revocation of a probation must 'not be capriciously had.
When the probation is revoked, the defendant is entitled to a hear-
ing. Mr. Justice Cardozo delivering the opinion in Escoe v. Zerbst30
pointed out the source of the privilege of a hearing is in the Proba-
tion Act rather than in the Fifth Amendment. Congress in the Act
commands:
"* * * that a probationer shall be brought before the Court. * * *
The revocation is not valid unless the command has been obeyed."
"* * * Clearly the end and aim of an appearance before the Court
must be to enable the accused probationer to explain away the ac-
cusation. The charge against him may have been inspired by rumor
or mistake or even downright malice. He shall have a chance to say his
say before the word of his pursuers is received to his undoing. This
does not mean that he may insist upon a trial in any strict or formal
sense."
Although it is clear that the trial judge may reduce the previously
imposed imprisonment sentence upon revocation of probation, it
does not necessarily follow that the trial court has the power to
increae a sentence previously imposed upon the revocation of pro-
bation. In United States v. Antinori31 the Court declined to rule
upon this question. It would appear from the language of the Act
that the power does exist, but if the Act intended to provide this,
it seems that it would be in conflict with the Fifth Amendment. In
the case of United States v. Benz32 the court said:
"The distinction that the Court during the same term may amend a
sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not so as to increase it,
is not based upon the ground that the Court has lost control of thejudgment in the latter case, but upon the ground that to increase the
penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment for the same
offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall 'be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'"
28 United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304.
29 275 U. S. 347.
30 295 .U. S. 490.
3159 Fed. 2d 171.
32282 U. S. 304.
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To Whom Probation Act Was Intended to Apply
Judge Henning in the case of United States v. Nix33 had the
following to say:
"No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the type of offenders
who should be considered for probation. * * * It is my view that the
Congress in passing the Probation Law had in mind, particularly, ju-
venile offenders, youthful offenders, first offenders and offenders whose
release on probation will not endanger the public and that where there is
reason to believe that the individual will make a serious effort to over-
come the abnormalities and difficulties which brought him into Court. In
general the offenses contemplated, as I view it, would be largely those
of a more or less minor character, are those induced by youth, inex-
perience, mental abnormalities, physical abnormalities, ignorance, pov-
erty, superstition, jealousy, or heat of passion. Conversely, I do not
think that the law, except in very rare cases, should have application
to hardened, habitual criminals, to those who need to be restrained as a
matter of protection to themselves and to society, or to those of mature
years, of fair education, of broad experience, who have committed some
very deliberate offense. A survey of the Probation System of the
several States supports this view."
Discharge from Probation
Upon successfully completing the period of probation, the pro-
bationer is entitled to a discharge from probation.
In the case of United States v. Maise1,3 4 Judge Hutcheson said:
"This defendant, having made his application under the statute so
conceived, having fully established during the period of his probation,
what the court tentatively decided to be true, when the imposition was
suspended, that the defendant was not anti-social by nature or habit
and that his offense was not habitual, but only a sporadic departure
from social obligations, justice, the interests of the public and of the
defendant alike, are subserved by fully discharging the proceedings
against the prisoner; and it will be so ordered."
He quoted DeQuiro's Modern Theories of Criminology, Sec. 38,
"When the period of probation ends favorably, there remains noth-
ing of the procedure, not even the record of the offense committed.
If anything remains, it is the healthful reform of the delinquent.
35
Many other questions of less moment have been presented to
the courts for decision. The matter of appeal to the higher courts
has been ruled upon. Appeal and not habeas corpus is the proper
33 8 Fed. 2d 759.
34 26 Fed. 2d 275.
35 In accord Hollandsworth v. United States, 24 Fed. 2d 423.
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remedy when trial judge has abused discretion in revoking pro-
bation."
Refusal of the trial judge to consider one for probation is not
subject for review, and appeal to the higher courts will not lie.3 7
-More than a hundred decisions have been published in the
reports in the twelve years of the Probation Act's existence. Most
of these were handed down from 1928 to 1933. Since that time the
number has diminished yearly until now they appear at the rate of
only two each year. It appears that on most of the interesting
problems arising under the act the courts have spoken.
30 United States v. Mulligan, 48 Fed. 2d 93.
Vz Green, Moore & Co., et al. v. United States. 29 Fed. 2d 740.
